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NOTE
THE RIGHT TO A WELL-RESTED JURY
Caroline Howe*
The vast amount of control that state trial judges exercise over the dynamics
of their courtrooms is well established. The length of trial days and jury de-
liberations, however, has received little scholarly attention. Longstanding re-
search has conclusively established the disruptive effects of sleep deprivation
on many of the mental facilities necessary for juries to competently fulfill
their duties. By depriving juries of sleep, trial judges may be compromising
the fair rights of criminal defendants for the sake of efficiency. This Note ar-
gues that trial judges must use their discretion to ensure juries are well rested,
keeping jurors’ needs in mind. Further, state legislatures have a responsibility
to properly fund state courts and to pass legislation that ensures overlong tri-
al days do not impact verdicts handed down.
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INTRODUCTION
In a small Louisiana courtroom in 1966, the government presented evi-
dence in a three-defendant criminal trial from 3:00 in the afternoon to 11:00
that night.1 Instead of heading home, the jury remained in the courthouse to
hear defense counsel present their case from midnight to 3:00 a.m.2 August
Gueldner, William Skinner, and Alton Charbonnet were all convicted.3 In a
habeas petition, they claimed that their due process right to a fair trial was
denied.4 They argued that the expectation that jurors would be able to con-
tinue paying attention to the evidence so late into the night raised a host of
constitutional problems.5 But, like countless courts that have tackled this is-
sue, the district court declined to find a constitutional violation.6 In the deci-
sion, the judge held that because there had been no finding that the jurors
were sleeping, and because they were conscious, jurors were presumed to be
“conscientiously fulfill[ing] their oath.”7
Nearly fifty years later, Susan Walls was rushed from a Tennessee court-
room to the hospital with stroke-like symptoms at the conclusion of her tri-
al.8 Rather than wrapping up the trial for the day, the jury, judge, attorneys,
and courtroom staff waited two and a half hours for the defendant to return
before beginning deliberations. The jury returned a guilty verdict at 1:05
a.m.9 Once again, the court found that because the jurors were awake, no
constitutional violations had occurred.10
These cases are unusual, not because the jury heard evidence ten hours
after the normal business day ended or because the jury deliberated well into
the night, but because these issues were raised on appeal at all. Across the
United States, trials are being held into the night, and jurors are deliberating
long after the normal business day ends. These long days and nights have
1. Gueldner v. Heyd, 311 F. Supp. 1168, 1174–75 (E.D. La. 1970), aff’d sub. nom. Unit-
ed States ex rel. Charbonnet v. Heyd, 432 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.), and aff’d, 434 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1175.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1174–75.
7. Id. at 1175.
8. State v. Walls, 537 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Tenn. 2017).
9. Id. at 897–98.
10. Id.
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implications for every actor in the criminal justice system. But the scope of
the issue remains unknown because defense attorneys do not regularly pre-
serve the issue for appellate review.11 When they do, the claims are rarely
successful.12
The problem of sleep deprivation among juries, lawyers, and judges has
been largely unexplored, despite the increasing frequency of long trial days
and long jury deliberations. This Note examines both trial day length and
jury deliberation length in the context of state criminal trials. It considers the
ways in which the attention and physical and emotional stamina of jurors,
judges, counsel, witnesses, and courtroom officials are critical. During a trial,
a case is presented in a method unfamiliar to most laypeople. Evidence must
be introduced via ritualistic performances, witnesses must be prompted by
carefully worded questions, and objections and instructions to the jury crop
up routinely. Faced with such a novel format, jurors must listen carefully.
Judges must be prepared to handle nuanced arguments, objections, and un-
expected issues. Counsel must be prepared to object, cross-examine, and ad-
vocate. Even after all of the evidence has been presented, the job of jurors
continues to be multifaceted. In deliberations, the jury discusses, dissects,
and debates the evidence. While these conversations are happening, jurors
need to maintain an open mind while also trying to come to the proper re-
sult. The demands of this process require concentration and care from all of
these actors. This human component of the constitutional rights guaranteed
to criminal defendants by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments has
too often been neglected and undermined. This Note seeks to change that.
Trial judges exercise relatively unfettered discretion to manage trials and
set hours in their courtrooms.13 But because there is no constitutional un-
derpinning for a due process violation on the basis of juror sleep deprivation,
defendants do not have a clear avenue for relief when a judge abuses this dis-
cretion. The scientific community, however, has long been in agreement on
the negative effects sleep deprivation has on cognitive performance, moral
11. There is currently no articulated right to a well-rested jury. Defense counsel general-
ly has little incentive to preserve fruitless issues. See, e.g., Ian S. Speir & Nima H. Mohebbi,
Preservation Rules in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 16 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 281, 283–84
(2015).
12. See infra note 17 (listing twenty-six cases where jury fatigue was addressed on ap-
peal, of which only four were reversed and remanded on that issue).
13. See Francis R. Fecteau & Jennifer Scro, Appellate Gaul Revisited: Standards in Search
of Definition, 97 MASS. L. REV. 7, 11–12 (2015) (“[T]he concept of unguided discretion can be
most readily seen in cases reviewing ‘the scheduling of trial . . . and scope of discovery and pro-
tective orders.’ In these cases, judges’ orders are rarely determined to be an abuse of discretion,
mainly because they typically involve courtroom management. Therefore, there are no addi-
tional legal standards or factors that the judges must show they properly considered.” (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting Hanover Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 705 N.E.2d 279, 286 (Mass. App. Ct.
1999))); see also State v. Parisien, 703 N.W.2d 306, 311 (N.D. 2005) (“A trial court has broad
discretion over the conduct of a trial, including the time in which a jury may properly deliber-
ate, but the court must exercise this discretion in a manner that best comports with substantial
justice.”).
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judgment, and the retention of positive versus negative information.14 Yet no
modern study has examined the length of trial days in state criminal courts,
or in any court in the United States.15 Additionally, studies of jury delibera-
tion length have been limited.16 Without this information, it is difficult to
appreciate the scope of the problem. But even without hard statistics, in-
stances of overly long trial days and jury deliberations have found their way
into published state appellate court decisions in almost half of the states and
Puerto Rico.17
Despite not having a formally recognized right to relief from any state or
federal court, defendants have challenged the fundamental fairness of ver-
dicts handed down after punishingly long trial days.18 When sleep-related
fairness arguments have been raised, courts have failed to develop a uniform
approach to handling them.19 Without further research, the full extent of the
problem remains unknown. But we do know that courts across the country
are facing extreme budget cuts that affect their ability to manage their dock-
14. See infra Part II.
15. One study from 1988 compared the length of jury versus nonjury trials and criminal
versus civil trials in order to discover which factors contributed to longer trials (in terms of
overall trial length, not the length of a trial day). DALE ANNE SIPES & MARY ELSNER ORAM, ON
TRIAL: THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS 12–21 (1988). No study examining how
long criminal trial courts stay in session has, to the knowledge of the author, ever been con-
ducted.
16. Michele Bisaccia Meitl et al., Predicting the Length of Jury Deliberations, 40 J. CRIME
& JUST. 238 (2017); Thomas L. Brunell et al., Factors Affecting the Length of Time a Jury Delib-
erates: Case Characteristics and Jury Composition, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 555 (2009).
17. See Kimble v. State, 539 P.2d 73, 79 (Alaska 1975); State v. Lautzenheiser, 864 P.2d
1058, 1062 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993), vacated, 881 P.2d 339 (Ariz. 1994); Styler v. State, 417 A.2d
948, 950–51 (Del. 1980); Shultheis v. Gotlin, 919 So. 2d 546, 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(overly long trial days and jury deliberation raised in a medical malpractice suit); Richardson v.
State, 338 S.E.2d 506, 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Dambrell, 817 P.2d 646, 654 (Idaho
1991); People v. Hanks, 569 N.E.2d 205, 208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d
649, 652–57 (Iowa 1970); Jenkins v. Commonwealth, No. 2006–CA–000158–MR, 2007 WL
706843, at *7 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2007), rev’d, 308 S.W.3d 704 (Ky. 2010); People v. Sawyer,
545 N.W.2d 6, 13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Sanders, 376 N.W.2d 196, 204 (Minn. 1985);
Grimsley v. Tyner, 454 So. 2d 482, 485 (Miss. 1984); State v. Wells, 639 S.W.2d 563, 568–69
(Mo. 1982); Jahnke v. State, 94 N.W. 158, 168 (Neb. 1903), rev’d, 104 N.W. 154 (Neb. 1905);
People v. Townes, 529 N.Y.S.2d 897, 897–98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); State v. Baldwin, 540
S.E.2d 815, 824 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); Parisien, 703 N.W.2d at 315; State v. Purdin, No.
12CA944, 2013 WL 84897, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2013); Stiles v. State, 829 P.2d 984,
994 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 504 A.2d 940, 941 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986); State v. Finney, 337 N.W.2d 167, 168–69 (S.D. 1983); State v. Walls, 537 S.W.3d 892,
899–900 (Tenn. 2017); Garza v. State, 783 S.W.2d 796, 798–99 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Boyd, 25 P.3d 985, 996 (Utah 2001); State v. Harrington, 80-446-CR, 1980 WL 99468, at *1
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 1980); Pueblo v. Figueroa Rosa, 12 P.R. Offic. Trans. 186, 189–91
(1982).
18. See supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., Walls, 537 S.W.3d at 904 (“There is a lack of a clear and unequivocal rule of
law concerning late night court proceedings; accordingly, no such rule could have been
breached in this case, thus plain error review cannot be applied herein to grant the defendant
relief.”).
May 2020] The Right to a Well-Rested Jury 1463
ets, forcing them to do more with less.20 The problem of overly long trial
days and jury deliberations will not be resolved without a concerted effort on
the part of judges, attorneys, and legislators.21
Three modern cases highlight the extremes of trial days and jury delib-
erations, as well as the often-indifferent response of appellate courts. First, in
2004, a jury was not excused to deliberate in Travis Parisien’s case until 7:40
p.m.22 In total, the jury worked a seventeen-hour day.23 Parisien appealed the
verdict, claiming that the overly long trial day and jury deliberation was co-
ercive. The Supreme Court of North Dakota presumed that it was not, and
Parisien’s challenge to this overly long trial day and jury deliberation, with-
out more, failed to sway the court.24 Second, in 2005, at 12:10 a.m. in a Ken-
tucky courtroom, a trial judge instructed a deadlocked jury to continue
deliberating, and eventually it arrived at a unanimous verdict against de-
fendant John Tim Jenkins.25 The Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that
“there are situations so egregious as to amount to a deprivation of due pro-
cess”; this case, however, was not one of them.26 Any defining characteristics
of this threshold remain unclear.27 Third, in 2011, Rocky Purdin rested his
defense in Ohio state court at 5:00 p.m. on a Friday.28 The trial judge gave
the jurors three options: (1) return to court the next day, Saturday, to delib-
erate at 9:00 a.m.; (2) return on Monday morning to deliberate; or (3) begin
deliberating that night.29 Because no juror protested staying later, the trial
court sent the jurors off to deliberate at 9:00 p.m.30 By 3:30 a.m., the jurors
reached their verdict: the prosecution got its conviction.31 The Court of Ap-
peals of Ohio differentiated the case from a 1970 Iowa Supreme Court deci-
sion, which had reversed and remanded a jury verdict conviction handed
20. See, e.g., Lorie S. Gildea & Matt Tews, The Right to Simple Justice: The Primary First
Principle, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 6, 10 (2012); see also infra Section III.A.
21. See infra Part III.
22. Parisien, 703 N.W.2d at 309, 314.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 315. Mixed with several other errors that occurred during the jury delibera-
tion, the court found that “the errors are so intertwined and interrelated that . . . the cumula-
tive effect of the errors requires reversal of all three criminal judgments and a remand for a
new trial.” Id.
25. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, No. 2006–CA–000158–MR, 2007 WL 706843, at *7 (Ky.
Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2007), rev’d, 308 S.W.3d 704 (Ky. 2010).
26. Id.
27. Id. (“[W]e again emphasize that there are situations in which the spirit of a fair trial
would be violated if jurors, by virtue of deliberations extending well-beyond the limits of nor-
mal endurance, were too exhausted to render a reasoned verdict. However, that situation did
not obtain in this case and is not cause for reversal of Jenkins’ convictions.”).
28. State v. Purdin, No. 12CA944, 2013 WL 84897, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 4, 2013).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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down at 4:30 a.m.32 By comparison, the judge claimed that despite the 3:30
a.m. verdict, there was “no indication that the jury was fatigued or that there
was a ‘premium on stamina and strength rather than judgment.’ ”33 For the
court, that single hour seemed to have made all the difference between a fair
and a fundamentally unfair trial.
This small sampling of cases exemplifies how physically taxing it can be
for defense counsel, witnesses, court employees, and jurors to participate in
the criminal trial process. It also illustrates appellate courts’ typical indiffer-
ence to the due process rights of the defendants who raise these issues.
Something important is being lost in translation for these judges.34
This Note argues that judges must exercise their discretion to ensure de-
fendants’ fair trial rights are not eroded by overly long trial days or jury de-
liberations. Part I explains how overly long trial days and deliberations are in
tension with defendants’ constitutional rights to a fair and speedy trial as
well as to effective assistance of counsel. Part II examines scientific research
on how sleep deprivation affects reasoning and moral judgment and con-
cludes that sleep deprivation during the presentation of evidence and jury
deliberation violates the right to a fair trial. Part III contends that the best
solutions to these violations is a combination of (a) judicial discretion exer-
cised to cabin trial day length, and (b) legislative action to set hard limits.
These solutions empower judges, counsel, and legislators to extend constitu-
tional guarantees to criminal defendants in areas where rights infringement
regularly occurs.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE RIGHT TO A WELL-RESTED
TRIAL
An overburdened, underfunded criminal justice system jeopardizes de-
fendants’ constitutional guarantees to a fair trial and effective assistance of
counsel. Without strong protections against practices like requiring defense
counsel to present evidence at midnight35 or pressuring a jury to continue
deliberations for twenty-four hours straight,36 these constitutional guaran-
tees are guarantees in name only. In too many cases, overwhelmed state judi-
ciaries make compromises for the sake of efficiency that reduce protections
for defendants and forfeit these guarantees. These compromises are particu-
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting State v. Albers, 174 N.W.2d 649, 656 (Iowa 1970)).
34. See State v. Parton, 817 S.W.2d 28, 34–35 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (“When a trial
continues into the late night, other participants do not function to their optimal abilities. The
judge gets tired, whether he or she admits it. . . . Witnesses cannot perform their function to
the best of their ability when they are weary after a long and stressful day. . . . Many partici-
pants just want to get the case over with and go home. . . . [And w]hen the adversarial activities
are concluded, the jurors’ ultimate duties begin.”).
35. See Gueldner v. Heyd, 311 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (E.D. La. 1970), aff’d sub. nom. Unit-
ed States ex rel. Charbonnet v. Heyd, 432 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.), and aff’d, 434 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir.).
36. DeGrandis v. Fay, 335 F.2d 173, 174 (2d Cir. 1964).
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larly harmful in criminal court, where defendants’ liberty is at stake. Speedy
trial rights place courts in the uncomfortable and unconstitutional position
of trading fair trials for efficient trials that allow more cases to be pushed
through an overloaded docket. Overly long trial days and jury deliberations
serve as easy solutions for state judiciaries and legislatures in need of quick
fixes, but these solutions also regularly defeat the espoused principle of a fair
trial.
A. Right to a Fair Trial
The U.S. Constitution guarantees defendants a fair trial.37 Not every er-
ror that occurs in a trial rises to the level of a due process violation—trials
are a messy, adversarial business.38 However, a trial must be fair.39 To protect
the integrity of the adversarial process, the right to a fair trial must include
the right to reasonably alert and attentive actors participating in the trial,
during both the trial and the deliberations. Without this guarantee, it is im-
possible to ensure the fair exercise of other rights to which a defendant is en-
titled.40
While the right to a fair trial manifests in the form of specific rights,
such as an impartial jury and the right to confront one’s accuser, it is not a
hard-and-fast concept. Indeed, “[d]ue process of law requires that the pro-
ceedings shall be fair, but fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept. . . .
What is fair in one set of circumstances may be an act of tyranny in oth-
ers.”41 Courts animate this open-ended standard with substantive expecta-
tions for counsel, jurors, and judges; they, in turn, must advocate for the
correction of injustices.
Within the right to a fair trial is another implicit guarantee: attentive
participants. Defense attorneys who are unable to effectively communicate
during their closing arguments and jurors who are too exhausted to continue
37. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)
(“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the
Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution
guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ”
(citations omitted) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984))).
38. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690–91.
39. Standard elements of a fair trial include: the presumption of innocence, an impartial
jury, examination of adverse witnesses, the ability to offer testimony, and representation by
counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Some of these rights are explicitly stated in the text of the
Constitution, and others courts have developed over time. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
40. State v. McMullin, 801 S.W.2d 826, 832 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (“The protection
of the right of the defendant to the assistance of competent counsel requires that the court
schedule not be such that counsel competency is eroded by unusually long in-court hours. The
defendant’s right to due process of law requires that the jury deciding guilt or innocence be
shielded from fatigue that affects their mental and physical ability to function at normal lev-
els.”).
41. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 116–117 (1934).
1466 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:1459
debating the fairness of a particular outcome violate the core concept of pro-
cedural fairness. The right to a fair trial must be reimagined to include with-
in its scope the right to reasonably attentive participants, from the first
minute of voir dire to the final vote during deliberation.
B. Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
One of the essential components of a fair trial is the right to effective as-
sistance of counsel, safeguarded by the Sixth Amendment and strengthened
by subsequent Supreme Court precedent.42 Counsel cannot meaningfully
serve this purpose if they are unable to physically and mentally meet the de-
mands of their profession because they are undergoing undue exertion dur-
ing trial.43
The Supreme Court has recognized that effective assistance of counsel
requires the presence, advice, assistance, and advocacy of counsel during
“critical stage[s] of [the defendant’s] trial.”44 Without this representation, de-
fendants are denied the bundle of protections the Constitution affords them
when presenting a defense.45 Thus, in addition to operating as its own inde-
pendent guarantee to help defendants navigate the intricacies of the criminal
process, the right to counsel provides for the effective exercise of other con-
stitutional guarantees. The right to reasonably alert counsel is a right impli-
cated during the presentation of evidence by both sides at trial, but it directly
affects the evidence jurors will have available during their deliberations.46
The grueling nature of trial work is an accepted part of the criminal de-
fense profession.47 Attorneys working in criminal law operate in a field rife
with mental illness, substance abuse, and suicide.48 Given the stressful, high-
stakes nature of the profession, it is no surprise that “[l]awyers . . . average
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (extend-
ing the right to counsel to misdemeanors); Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (extending the right to counsel
to indigent defendants facing state felony charges).
43. See, e.g., Thornton v. State, 369 So. 2d 505, 506 (Miss. 1979).
44. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984); see also Burdine v. Johnson, 262
F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 2001).
45. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342–43; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932) (“The
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel. . . . Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction be-
cause he does not know how to establish his innocence.”).
46. See Burdine, 262 F.3d at 349.
47. It is important to acknowledge how many defendants will not benefit from any of
the changes recommended in this Note. By some estimates, 94 percent of state and 97 percent
of federal felony convictions are the result of plea bargains—those cases will never go to trial.
Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ [https://perma.cc/V3KR-65V8].
48. Suicide, A.B.A. (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/lawyer_assistance
/resources/suicide/ [https://perma.cc/9DDW-5GEH].
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less sleep than almost any other working professionals.”49 And trial is the big
show. As one law firm writes, a case is “often won during the trial by hard
work each and every night to prepare for the surprises of the next day and to
adjust to the inevitable changes in tactics and strategy required due to the
moves of the other side.”50
Despite the crucial influence assistance of counsel has on a defendant’s
fate, the Supreme Court has only gradually and sparingly acknowledged the
right to effective assistance of counsel.51 Though the Court set a base stand-
ard by which to measure counsels’ performance in Strickland v. Washington,
lower courts have given excessive deference to counsel under the label of
“strategy.”52
Two cases from Mississippi demonstrate how extraordinary the proofs
must be for an appellate court to find error. In Thornton v. State, after the
state rested its case at 6:00 p.m., the defendant’s attorneys—two of whom
were in their seventies—filed a motion for recess given the late hour, the
witnesses and evidence they planned on presenting, their age, and their habit
of going to bed early.53 The judge denied defense counsels’ motion for recess
at 6:00 p.m. and denied a second motion to dismiss four hours later at 10:00
p.m.54 During closing arguments, one defense attorney became extremely
disoriented and was subsequently hospitalized for days after being diagnosed
with “chronic organic brain syndrome.”55 The jury convicted the defendant,
49. Kimberly Sachs, Note, You Snooze, You Lose, and Your Client Gets a Retrial: United
States v. Ragin and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Sleeping Lawyer Cases, 62 VILL. L. REV.
427, 428 (2017).
50. Trial Preparation: What Happens in the Month Before Trial, STIMMEL, STIMMEL &
ROESER, http://www.stimmel-law.com/en/articles/trial-preparation-what-happens-month-trial
[https://perma.cc/FZC5-HRMB].
51. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Ef-
fective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 427
(1996).
52. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland established a two-pronged
test: counsel’s performance must be both unreasonable and prejudicial to the outcome at trial.
Under Strickland, “[a] defendant must show not only that his lawyer was incompetent, but that
the trial’s outcome would likely have been different had the attorney been more capable.” Ken
Armstrong, What Can You Do with a Drunken Lawyer?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 10, 2014),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/10/what-can-you-do-with-a-drunken-lawyer
[https://perma.cc/5HST-AEDP].
53. 369 So. 2d 505, 506 (Miss. 1979).
54. Thornton, 369 So. 2d at 506.
55. Id. at 505. This portion of the Supreme Court of Mississippi’s opinion is worth not-
ing:
[A]fter speaking five or six minutes, . . . . [the attorney] picked up the [jury] instruc-
tion . . . and read it completely to the jury four successive times. . . . He appeared com-
pletely disoriented and [his] son thought he was having a heart attack . . . .
. . . [U]pon reaching the emergency room . . . the attorney [was] obviously disori-
ented and extremely confused. . . . The diagnosis was that the attorney was suffering
with a chronic organic brain syndrome because of stress. . . .
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but, on appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that he had been de-
prived of effective assistance of counsel.56 In another Mississippi case, the
state’s highest court also found ineffective assistance of counsel after defense
counsel’s motion for a recess at 6:30 p.m. was denied.57 After ten hours of
work that day, including jury selection and cross-examination, defense
counsel informed the court that he was “extremely fatigued.”58 The trial
judge candidly explained why he needed to try the case into the night: “It is
imperative I get through the case tomorrow. I have some official business
that I have got to attend to, and it is very imperative that I be there on Fri-
day.”59 A scheduling conflict is a common but inappropriate reason to force
defense counsel to the point of physical collapse. These two cases demon-
strate how incredibly high the standard of proof is to find ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.
Given the stressful nature of trial work and the legal profession’s general
disregard for healthy sleep habits, it could be argued that limitations on trial
day length are immaterial. But while the personal habits of attorneys must be
left to their individual discretion, state governments cannot be responsible
for forcing attorneys to abandon healthy sleep habits, particularly during the
most stressful periods of their profession. When faced with analogous di-
lemmas, governments have imposed time restrictions even when they cannot
guarantee that workers actually sleep more. For example, laws requiring
commercial vehicle drivers to have at least ten hours of nondriving time after
a shift do not purport to measure the amount of sleep drivers actually get.60
Such a mandate would be—as a practical matter—beyond the scope of the
state’s legislative power. But attorneys should not be forced to perform cru-
cially important, constitutionally mandated roles without the opportunity for
adequate rest.61 Effective counsel requires adequate rest to cognitively per-
form as well as sufficient preparation time to be ready for the next day’s chal-
. . . .
. . . Even a panel of young jurors or an array of young attorneys would be preju-
diced by going through such an ordeal.
Id. at 506–07.
56. Id. at 507.
57. Edge v. State, 393 So. 2d 1337, 1342 (Miss. 1981).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1341–42. The Supreme Court of Mississippi continues to cite pre-Strickland
cases on attorney exhaustion with approval. E.g., Moffett v. State, 49 So. 3d 1073, 1113 (Miss.
2010) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 166–67 (1976)).
60. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-274 (2019).
61. The case for defendants with overworked counsel has also not been successful. Pub-
lic defender offices stretched to the breaking point like the Orleans Public Defenders have
stopped accepting felony cases in order to give each of their clients sufficiently effective counsel
rather than reducing their professional standards. New Orleans Public Defenders Refuse New
Cases to Highlight Underfunding, NPR (Jan. 29, 2016, 4:29 PM), http://www.npr.org
/2016/01/29/464893246/new-orleans-public-defenders-refuse-new-cases-to-highlight-
underfunding [https://perma.cc/EEB7-FMS9].
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lenges. Judges who keep counsel late during trial should acknowledge the re-
lationship between adequate sleep and effective representation.
C. Right to a Speedy Trial
A sleep-deprived courtroom also implicates the right to a speedy trial.62
This guarantee is incredibly powerful and, if violated, can lead to the dismis-
sal of charges against the accused.63 The Supreme Court applies four factors
when considering an alleged violation of a defendant’s speedy trial rights:
“(1) the length of the delay between arrest and trial, (2) the cause of that de-
lay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of their speedy trial right, and (4) the preju-
dice experienced by the defendant due to the delay.”64 This balancing test
helps the reviewing court decide whether the defendant or the state is pri-
marily at fault for the delay.65 The defendant’s assertion, or lack thereof, is
often viewed as the decisive factor in the analysis.66
A defendant’s access to a speedy trial is inexorably linked to court fund-
ing. Members of both the state and federal judiciary are at the mercy of legis-
lators who set their budgets.67 Although judicial operations typically absorb
only 1 to 4 percent of a given state’s budget, they are a frequent target of
spending cuts.68 Courts in a majority of states report budget cuts along with
increasing case backlogs.69 Across the nation, courts in some states are clos-
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63. Austin N. Priddy, Comment, Rethinking Indigent Defense in Louisiana: How Speedy
Trial Claims Can Actualize the Constitutional Right to Counsel Funded by the States, 89 TUL. L.
REV. 491, 505 (2014).
64. Id. at 505–06; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
65. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (“A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach
speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors
which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of
his right.”); Priddy, supra note 63, at 506 (“[I]f the cause of the delay is primarily or solely the
fault of the state, then it is more likely that a dismissal on speedy trial grounds will be grant-
ed.”).
66. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531–32 (“The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right, then,
is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived
of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant
to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.”).
67. Gildea & Tews, supra note 20.
68. Id. at 10 (“While state court budgets have been in decline over the last decade, the
financial crisis beginning in 2008 brought on the deepest cuts. In the three years after 2008, ‘the
courts of most states [were] forced to make do with 10 to 15% less funding than they had in
2007’. . . . despite the fact that the courts of every state make up only a tiny portion of the over-
all budget[] . . . .” (footnotes omitted) (quoting The ABA Task Force on the Preservation of the
Justice System, Report to the House of Delegates by the American Bar Association Task Force on
Preservation of the Justice System—Crisis in the Courts: Defining the Problem, 83 PA. B. ASS’N Q.
29 (2012))).
69. H. Mills Gallivan, Opinion, Disgraceful Injustice: Lack of Court Funding, POST &
COURIER (Jan. 18, 2015), https://www.postandcourier.com/opinion/disgraceful-injustice-lack-
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ing on certain days of the week, suspending civil trials for lengthy periods of
time, and, in some cases, permanently closing courthouses.70
The consequences of such a massive shortage of funding for the right to
a speedy trial vary. Some states have kept untried defendants in local jails for
extended periods of time or have been forced to release them.71 Recent ex-
amples from Minnesota, Georgia, and Oregon highlight the bind that these
courts are in: either house people for impermissibly lengthy periods of time
or drop charges and release defendants without a trial.72 The Supreme Court
has held that “[u]nintentional delays caused by overcrowded court dockets
or understaffed prosecutors are among the factors to be weighed less heavily
than intentional delay.”73 These factors are still critical to consider because
they are the government’s obligation, not the defendant’s.74
But the right to a speedy trial cannot and should not be an excuse for a
lack of a fair trial. Speedy trial guarantees and fair trial guarantees are not in-
terchangeable—both are equally essential to the fundamental fairness of a
criminal trial. Judges should not be in the business of pushing cases through
the system at accelerated rates because they have overcrowded dockets. Simi-
larly, legislators should not put such enormous pressure on an already pre-
carious system. The current solution of allowing trial courts to exercise their
discretion to force through cases by trying them late into the night compro-
mises the fair trial rights of the defendant whose liberty hangs in the balance.
* * *
Late night trials and jury deliberations raise a whole host of constitu-
tional concerns, but they are not the only practices that regularly intrude on
criminal defendants’ fair trial rights. Our criminal justice system is breaking
under the pressure of attempting to provide fair process to too many people
with too few resources.75 Criminal defendants, particularly indigent defend-
ants, often face a fundamentally unfair system. The issues raised in this Note
of-court-funding/article_3a5caacc-9d05-511b-b99c-b115e85d388a.html [https://perma.cc
/G9HD-PTVK].
70. Gildea & Tews, supra note 20, at 11.
71. Id. at 14–15.
72. Id. at 14–16. People held pre-trial are typically those defendants who either cannot
afford bail or who are considered a “flight risk” or a “danger to the community.” See ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE §§ 10–1.5, 5.8 (3d ed. 2007),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/
pretrial_release.pdf [https://perma.cc/UFE6-EM3H]. But judges and legislatures could low-
er the bail they set or do away with bail altogether. These options remain available avenues to
dealing with overcrowded dockets and speedy trial issues.
73. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 436 (1973).
74. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
75. Oliver Laughland, The Human Toll of America’s Public Defender Crisis, GUARDIAN
(Sept. 7, 2016, 6:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/07/public-defender-
us-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/D86E-9G2R].
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rest at the very center of many of these concerns: courts pushing cases
through their dockets so fast that fair process becomes a secondary or even
tertiary consideration, neglect for fundamental principles of fairness, and a
failure to understand how many of the basic elements of the criminal justice
system’s design implicitly favor conviction.76 While many of the issues above
cannot easily be solved, this Note offers practical solutions for government
and private actors that will provide more robust protection for criminal de-
fendants and better fulfill the principles—accuracy and fairness—that pro-
vide the foundation for our criminal justice system.77
II. THE SCIENCE OF SLEEP DEPRIVATION
Sleep deprivation is a well-understood human phenomenon, but human
institutions, especially the courts, have been remarkably unwilling to adapt
their practices to basic human needs. The scientific community uniformly
recognizes the negative effects sleep deprivation has on moral judgments,
retention of negative emotions, and emotional processing, including in-
creased irrationality.78 In particular, vigilance decreases when a person expe-
riences sleep deprivation.79 Without well-rested, fully functioning actors, the
fundamental rights to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel are com-
promised.
A. Making Moral Judgments
A conviction entered by a sleep-deprived jury, whose members have an
impaired ability to make moral judgments, violates a defendant’s fair trial
rights. Jurors who are deciding whether or not a defendant is guilty must
grapple with difficult moral decisions as they apply the law to the facts.
Bound up in these factual determinations are implicit moral judgments.
From sexual impropriety to crimes of poverty and violence, much of a state’s
criminal code involves understanding why people behave the way they do in
76. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense Crisis in
the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316, 2318–20 (2013); Richard A.
Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV. 187, 195–209
(2017); Cecelia Klingele et al., Essay, Reimagining Criminal Justice, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 953, 955–
63.
77. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) (“[T]he central purpose of any
system of criminal justice is to convict the guilty and free the innocent. . . . In any system of
criminal justice, ‘innocence’ or ‘guilt’ must be determined in some sort of a judicial proceed-
ing.” (citation omitted)).
78. See Paula Alhola & Päivi Polo-Kantola, Sleep Deprivation: Impact on Cognitive Per-
formance, 3 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 553, 553–55 (2007); Jeffrey S. Durmer
& David F. Dinges, Neurocognitive Consequences of Sleep Deprivation, 25 SEMINARS
NEUROLOGY 117, 120–121 (2005).
79. Alhola & Polo-Kantola, supra note 78, at 555.
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a particular situation and then casting judgment on those actions.80 A study
comparing participants’ responses to morally difficult situations before and
after sleep deprivation showed that “when sleep deprived, individuals appear
to be selectively slower in their deliberations about [moral personal] dilem-
mas relative to other types of dilemmas.”81 Sleep deprivation has a “particu-
larly debilitating effect on judgment and decision making processes that de-
depend heavily upon the integration of emotion with cognition.”82 Tasks
such as hearing evidence and deliberating on a defendant’s guilt—tasks rife
with real-world morality and challenging judgment calls—become vastly
more difficult when jurors are sleep deprived.83 Many of the studies dis-
cussed in this Part examine participants under far longer periods of sleep
deprivation than jurors would typically experience. The results, however,
demonstrate just how little sleep loss it takes to impact a person’s psychology
and physiology.84
A second study found that sleep deprivation causes a greater retention of
negative emotion as opposed to positive emotion.85 Links between depres-
sion and sleep deprivation also highlight this connection.86 The difference
between finding a defendant guilty or not guilty often depends on how posi-
tive and negative evidence are processed and weighed by jurors and judges.
Frequently, a verdict in a criminal trial depends on counteracting negative
evidence, such as witness testimony or scientific evidence. Positive evidence,
such as an alibi or alternative explanation for negative evidence, would be
likely to receive less attention and be given less weight by a sleep-deprived
jury.87 If negative testimony is given more weight—even unconsciously—by
sleep-deprived jurors, the defendant’s right to a fair trial is compromised.
Animating this open-ended trial right with concrete evidence of the necessi-
ty of well-rested jurors would ensure that defendants’ evidence is given equal
weight and credence by jurors.
80. See Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the
Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1402–03 (1986).
81. William D.S. Killgore et al., The Effects of 53 Hours of Sleep Deprivation on Moral
Judgment, 30 SLEEP 345, 351 (2007).
82. Id. at 350.
83. Id. at 351.
84. See infra Section II.D.
85. Robert Stickgold & Peter Wehrwein, Health for Life: The Link Between Sleep and
Memory, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 17, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/health-life-link-
between-sleep-and-memory-77579 [https://perma.cc/75XD-WE2V]; see also Ninad Gujar et
al., Sleep Deprivation Amplifies Reactivity of Brain Reward Networks, Biasing the Appraisal of
Positive Emotional Experiences, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE 4466 (2011), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih
.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3086142/ [https://perma.cc/FZ3R-4HTR].
86. Stickgold & Wehrwein, supra note 85.
87. Els van der Helm et al., Sleep Deprivation Impairs the Accurate Recognition of Hu-
man Emotions, 33 SLEEP 335, 335 (2010) (“Sleep deprivation selectively impairs the accurate
judgment of human facial emotions, especially threat relevant (Anger) and reward relevant
(Happy) categories, an effect observed most significantly in females.”).
May 2020] The Right to a Well-Rested Jury 1473
B. Heightened Emotions and Irrationality
In addition to making moral judgments during deliberations, jurors of-
ten discuss and evaluate highly emotional evidence and testimony. Sleep
deprivation compromises jurors’ ability to perform this task. In one study
from Harvard Medical School and the University of California, Berkeley, re-
searchers found that sleep deprivation “excessively boost[s] the part of the
brain most closely connected to depression, anxiety and other psychiatric
disorders.”88 According to the senior author of the study, “[i]t’s almost as
though, without sleep, the brain had reverted back to more primitive pat-
terns of activity, in that it was unable to put emotional experiences into con-
text and produce controlled, appropriate responses.”89 For example, if a
person with healthy sleep patterns watches a violent movie, “the prefrontal
cortex lets the brain know that the scene is make-believe and to settle
down.”90
That same neurological response is missing in sleep-deprived people. In-
stead, the oldest section of the brain releases a chemical, noradrenaline, to
protect against risks to the person’s survival.91 Even in people without diag-
nosed psychiatric disorders, sleep deprivation can mirror “certain pathologi-
cal psychiatric patterns.”92 Another study from the same researchers
explored how the brain’s executive functions are altered during sleep depri-
vation. People become “hypersensitive to rewarding stimuli,” making “emo-
tional responses . . . heightened” and creating irrational behavior.93
This research suggests that sleep-deprived jurors are more susceptible to
respond to emotionally charged evidence in a visceral, irrational manner.
Preventing jurors from resting enhances the intense emotions involved in an
already overtly emotional process of hearing details of disturbing crimes. Ju-
rors’ inability to properly contextualize their responses to difficult evidence
due to state-imposed sleep deprivation exposes defendants to a “trial by
emotion,” thereby violating their right to a fair trial. Forcing jurors to hear
evidence and deliberate in such a high intensity situation without the benefit
of reflection and rest exposes the defendant to too much prejudice.94
88. Yasmin Anwar, Sleep Loss Linked to Psychiatric Disorders, U.C. BERKELEY NEWS
(Oct. 22, 2007), https://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2007/10/22_sleeploss.shtml
[https://perma.cc/MCW6-PBZK].
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Moheb Costandi, The Sleep-Deprived Brain, DANA FOUND. (July 18, 2018),
https://dana.org/article/the-sleep-deprived-brain/ [https://perma.cc/T44Y-FBDX]; Gujar et al.,
supra note 85.
94. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 403 (articulating the standard that courts should exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, which suggests
that courts should take into account the prejudicial effect of sleep deprivation on a juror’s abil-
ity to fairly hear a case).
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C. Focus and Forgetfulness
Another symptom of sleep deprivation is increased forgetfulness and the
inability to retain information. While there are no definitive answers about
exactly why sleep is a biological necessity,95 many researchers believe that
one of the important functions of sleep is memory consolidation.96 Though a
person creates and recalls memories while awake, the intermediary stage—
consolidation—is necessary for memories to be stored properly and re-
trieved more easily later.97 When jurors deliberate after hours—often days—
of hearing complex evidence, memory retrieval is essential. Jurors denied
adequate rest may lose their memories of the trial itself. A defendant is de-
nied their right to a fair trial when the jury is not actually recalling and
weighing the evidence that was presented.98
Additionally, sleep deprivation compromises one’s ability to focus. Con-
centrating on a specific task becomes far more difficult after only twenty-
four hours of sleep deprivation.99 Sleep deprivation also has links with disor-
ders like Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).100 The two con-
ditions are closely linked: “[A]s many as 75 percent of people with
ADHD . . . may have a chronic, underlying sleep problem.”101
For jurors who are attempting to engage with complex evidence, even a
small dose of sleep deprivation can compromise their ability to focus on a
specific task or engage with multiple pieces of evidence. Focus also has im-
plications for defense counsel and judges during long trial days. Defense
counsel must be constantly vigilant during the presentation of evidence in
order to object, conduct effective direct and cross-examinations, and make
95. Jerome M. Siegel, Why We Sleep, SCI. AM., Nov. 2003, at 92, 92 (“[W]e have no
comparably straightforward explanation for sleep.”).
96. E.g., Michael Breus, Here’s Why You Can’t Think Straight When You’re Sleep De-
prived, SLEEP DR. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://thesleepdoctor.com/2018/04/17/heres-why-you-cant-
think-straight-when-youre-sleep-deprived/ [https://perma.cc/BDV2-F7ZV].
97. Id.
98. The issue of memory consolidation is even more important in states and jurisdic-
tions where jurors are not allowed to take notes, a process known to increase recall. Vaiva Kal-
nikaitė & Steve Whittaker, Does Taking Notes Help You Remember Better? Exploring How Note
Taking Relates to Memory, UNIFR (Sept. 4, 2007), https://diuf.unifr.ch/people/lalanned
/MeMos07/files/kalnikaite.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MX9-2MSH]; Notetaking by Jurors,
USLEGAL, https://courts.uslegal.com/jury-system/issues-pertaining-to-the-jurys-performance-
of-its-duties/notetaking-by-jurors/ [https://perma.cc/S6D4-98GV] (“Although only one state
expressly prohibits this practice, in most jurisdictions whether members of a jury are allowed
to take notes will depend upon the discretion of the judge. One survey indicated that 37 per-
cent of the judges in state courts indicate they do not allow jurors to take notes during a trial.”).
99. Eve Wiggins et al., 24-h Sleep Deprivation Impairs Early Attentional Modulation of
Neural Processing: An Event-Related Brain Potential Study, 677 NEUROSCIENCE LETTERS 32, 32
(2018).
100. Breus, supra note 96; Vatsal Thakkar, How Sleep Deprivation Looks a Lot Like
ADHD, ADDITUDE (updated June 18, 2019), https://www.additudemag.com/symptoms-of-
insomnia/ [https://perma.cc/2YJG-PKN8].
101. Breus, supra note 96.
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off-the-cuff decisions about trial strategy. These decisions become monu-
mentally more difficult if the attorney is unable to focus. Judges must medi-
ate any conflicts arising between the prosecution and defense, monitor the
progress of the trial, and ensure that all actors are fulfilling their roles effec-
tively. The memory and attention of all trial participants are thus compro-
mised when they do not get sufficient sleep during the high-stress, high-
stakes trial and deliberation days.
D. Length of Sleep Deprivation
Somewhat surprisingly, sleep deprivation experienced over even short
periods of time can still wreak havoc on people’s ability to perform cogni-
tively. One study conducted by two psychologists found that moderate sleep
deprivation, or seventeen to nineteen hours without sleep, produces the
same effects as alcohol intoxication on cognitive and motor performance.102
Jurors come into the courthouse from many walks of life—everyone from
parents of small children to students to workers fresh off of a night shift.
Add to that reality a trial day lasting past 5:00 p.m., and every person in the
courtroom feels the fatigue of a long, exhausting day. Jurors may simply not
be well rested enough to be effective decision makers if they are forced to
hear evidence or deliberate late into the night.
It is true that, even if the trial court or state legislature were to designate
certain hours for rest during the trial and deliberation, it would be up to the
individual discretion of each attorney, judge, or juror to take advantage of
this period of potential rest. While the state cannot regulate how jurors
spend their free time, the state should still not actively prevent attorneys,
judges, or jurors from getting adequate rest, should they so choose. As with
other constitutional guarantees—the right to effective assistance of coun-
sel,103 the right to a jury selected by racially impartial means104—the right to
well-rested trial participants may not always be perfectly achieved, but the
state can refrain from standing in the way.
E. Other Areas of the Law
Other areas of the law, ranging from motor vehicle regulation to confes-
sion law, have acknowledged the vital role sleep plays in decisionmaking
processes.105 Legislators, supported by research, have determined that oper-
102. A M Williamson & Anne-Marie Feyer, Moderate Sleep Deprivation Produces Im-
pairments in Cognitive and Motor Performance Equivalent to Legally Prescribed Levels of Alco-
hol Intoxication, 57 OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 649, 649 (2000); see also Nicole Lamond &
Drew Dawson, Quantifying the Performance Impairment Associated with Fatigue, 8 J. SLEEP
RES. 255 (1999) (finding similar results).
103. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
104. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
105. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (“In determining whether a
defendant’s will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has assessed the totality of all the
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ating a commercial vehicle after sleep deprivation risks unsafe consequences
on the road for the truck driver and other drivers.106 For confessions ob-
tained while a person is in police custody, the Supreme Court has held that
sleep deprivation is an important consideration in determining the voluntar-
iness of the confession.107 If legislators and judges already recognize that
sleep deprivation must be prevented when it comes to community safety and
the accuracy of convictions, they should expand these safeguards to trial and
jury deliberations.
A groundbreaking study on judges’ food breaks underscores important
parallels with overly long trial days and jury deliberations. A study of Israeli
judges revealed that judges rule more favorably for defendants at the begin-
ning of the workday and after a food break as compared with times later in
the day.108 The study found that:
[E]xperienced parole judges in Israel granted freedom about 65 percent of
the time to the first prisoner who appeared before them on a given day. By
the end of a morning session, the chance of release had dropped almost to
zero.
After the same judge returned from a lunch break, the first prisoner
once again had about a 65 percent chance at freedom.109
The authors suggested a potential reason for this discrepancy: making deci-
sions repeatedly wears out one’s brain in the same way that repeated exercise
wears out one’s other muscles.110 Tiredness inevitably leads to shortcuts.
Shortcuts lead to less nuanced decisionmaking: “[O]ne of the easiest
shortcuts is to uphold the status quo—in this case, denying parole.”111 The
surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the in-
terrogation. Some of the factors taken into account have included . . . the use of physical pun-
ishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep . . . .”); Farrell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 488, 492
(Ind. 1993) (“The importance of sleep is also recognized in various laws. For example, the
number of hours motor carriers may operate is regulated.”).
106. E.g., Maggie’s Law: National Drowsy Driving Act of 2003, H.R. 968, 108th Cong. § 2
(2003) (presenting congressional findings on the dangers of driver fatigue and sleep depriva-
tion); see also Acute Sleep Deprivation and Risk of Motor Vehicle Crash Involvement, AAA
(Dec. 2016), http://aaafoundation.org/acute-sleep-deprivation-risk-motor-vehicle-crash-
involvement/ [https://perma.cc/3MM7-PTE3] (“The results of this drowsy driving study indi-
cate that drivers who usually sleep for less than 5 hours daily, drivers who have slept for less
than 7 hours in the past 24 hours, and drivers who have slept for 1 or more hours less than
their usual amount of sleep in the past 24 hours have significantly elevated crash rates.”).
107. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226; see also Carter v. State, 241 P.3d 476, 486 (Wyo. 2010)
(“We have recognized that sleep deprivation and intoxication are factors which can make a
statement involuntary.”).
108. Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6889 (2011).
109. Binyamin Appelbaum, Up for Parole? Better Hope You’re First on the Docket, N.Y.
TIMES: ECONOMIX (Apr. 14, 2011, 10:00 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011
/04/14/time-and-judgment/ [https://perma.cc/T9XJ-YEXU].
110. See Danziger et al., supra note 108, at 6889.
111. Appelbaum, supra note 109.
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results of this study show just how prone judges, like all humans, are to the
effects of variables like hunger, which in turn lead to inevitable biases.112
This study peels back the shroud of judicial mystique. Judges are people
too and are susceptible to the same psychological pressures as everyone else.
If a judge’s temporal proximity to a meal can have such a powerful effect on
the outcome of their decisions, a full night of sleep will surely have profound
consequences on all participants in the system—not just experienced and
professional judges. Sleep deprivation and hunger are both predictable hu-
man conditions. And while there will inevitably be variation, especially given
the wide variety of outside influences (habits, childhood environment, life-
style, health), the medical community is in agreement on the impacts of
both.113
The effects of intoxication—including compromised cognitive abili-
ties—are also well understood and well regulated.114 Among other symp-
toms, drinking is linked to issues with reasoning and memory, mood
changes, memory loss, and harm to fine motor skills.115 It is likewise under-
stood that “[i]nadequate sleep exerts a similar influence on our brain as
drinking too much.”116 But proof of prolonged substance use and abuse dur-
ing a trial has not historically been enough for the Court to rule counsel inef-
fective: “In cases where a criminal defendant’s attorney has been impaired
due to alcohol or drugs, the lower courts have uniformly applied the Strick-
land test to evaluate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and required
the defendant to show prejudice.”117 Abuses of everything from cocaine to
prescription medications have likewise been dismissed in state and federal
courts across the country as “not creat[ing] per se ineffectiveness.”118 Modern
courts have shied away from calling for automatic mistrials when jurors in-
dulge, but such behavior can still be grounds for a mistrial if the defendant is
“prejudiced or deprived of some right as the result of such use.”119 Appellate
courts’ failure to sanction juror and counsel intoxication is troubling because
112. Danziger et al., supra note 108, at 6889.
113. See Williamson & Feyer, supra note 102, at 649; Jennifer MacCormack, The Science
of Hangry, QUARTZ (June 14, 2018), https://qz.com/1305653/why-do-you-get-hangry-the-
science-of-hungry-angry/ [https://perma.cc/73NF-7UAN].
114. Jerry R. Balentine, Alcohol Intoxication, EMEDICINEHEALTH (updated Dec. 13,
2018), https://www.emedicinehealth.com/alcohol_intoxication/article_em.htm [https://perma
.cc/FS6J-F3NZ] (“Most states have specific levels at which the driving of a motor vehicle is for-
bidden.”).
115. How Alcohol Impacts the Brain, NW. MED., https://www.nm.org/healthbeat/healthy-
tips/alcohol-and-the-brain [https://perma.cc/L2P5-W6NR].
116. New Study Reveals Sleep Deprivation Disrupts Brain-Cell Communication, MED.
XPRESS (Nov. 6, 2017), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2017-11-reveals-deprivation-disrupts-
brain-cell.html [https://perma.cc/4GBK-DD5F].
117. Kirchmeier, supra note 51, at 455.
118. Id. at 457–58.
119. C.R. McCorkle, Annotation, Use of Intoxicating Liquor by Jurors: Criminal Cases, 7
A.L.R.3d § 2[a] (1966).
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intoxication, like sleep deprivation, “lessen[s] respect for and confidence in
the courts and the integrity of jury trials.”120
The notion that a defendant could be deprived of a sober attorney or ju-
ry and still enjoy a functioning and uncompromised fair trial is untenable.
Counsel must exercise constant vigilance throughout each day of trial, decid-
ing whether to object to testimony, cross-examine a witness, or present evi-
dence and working to appear professional and appropriate in front of twelve
people deciding their client’s fate. Intoxication, just as with sleep depriva-
tion, impairs a person’s reasoning, memory, and ability to control them-
selves,121 which would actively hinder an attorney from performing any of
their essential trial duties. For jurors, the effects of drugs, alcohol, or sleep
deprivation compromise their ability to absorb new information, process
that information, and come to an agreement with other people.122 Sleep dep-
rivation affects more than blood sugar—it alters a person’s ability to make
moral judgments, process emotions, focus, and remember information, all
after only one night without adequate sleep.123 Thus, courts are wrong to
conclude, as they often do, that attorneys, jurors, and judges suffering from
too little sleep have not fundamentally impaired a defendant’s constitutional
guarantees.124
* * *
The scientific studies discussed in this Section only confirm what most
people already intuitively understand: sleep is essential to our ability to func-
tion, especially in a high-stakes, pressure-filled environment like a court-
room trial. While sleeping prevents a juror, judge, or attorney’s cognitive
performance altogether, sleep deprivation alters it.125 The effects of a lack of
adequate sleep are not up for debate. Among the biggest bets a defendant
makes is placing faith in the competence of his or her counsel, the prosecu-
tor, the judge, and the jury at trial. Defendants deserve, and are constitution-
ally entitled to, adequately rested and cognitively functioning participants.
To date, only the Indiana Supreme Court has found it useful to rely on
the overwhelming evidence establishing the negative impacts of sleep depri-
vation.126 On appeal, the defendant in Farrell v. State argued that his right to
a fair trial was violated by the judge’s decision to continue jury deliberations
120. See id.
121. How Alcohol Impacts the Brain, supra note 115.
122. See id.
123. See supra Sections II.A–D.
124. See Rhandi Childress, Convicted by a Sleeping Jury: Harmless Error or a Challenge to
the Integrity of Our Criminal Justice System?, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 751, 772 (2011) (“Sleep-
ing jurors impair the fairness of our criminal justice system, and they should not be tolerated
any more than sleeping counsel.”).
125. Stickgold & Wehrwein, supra note 85.
126. See Farrell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Ind. 1993).
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despite clear indications of juror fatigue. That court found that the necessity
of sleep “for rational human activity has been established by various sleep-
deprivation studies.”127 The court continued, “[t]hese studies show that peo-
ple who are deprived of adequate sleep are less capable of thinking clearly,
maintaining long attention spans, controlling anger, and, most importantly
in the context of a criminal trial, making appropriate judgments.”128 Courts
should rely on the science of sleep deprivation to draw clearer lines between
acceptable uses of judicial discretion and wholesale abrogation of a defend-
ant’s constitutional rights. The next Section examines how judges, legisla-
tors, and attorneys can use their influence and their positions to protect a
defendant’s fair trial rights, even in a system designed to always push one
more case through a crowded docket.
III. MAKING JUDICIAL DISCRETION OPERATE MORE EFFECTIVELY
This Part discusses solutions that have the greatest likelihood of improv-
ing lengthy trials and jury deliberations and ensuring a fair and speedy trial
for defendants. The most important actors with the greatest opportunity to
effect change—owing to their enormous discretion—are judges. As previ-
ously noted, judges enjoy considerable discretion in establishing the norms
and procedures in their courtrooms. Too often, that discretion has been
misused to compel late-night trials, in which sleep-deprived jurors are ex-
pected to consider evidence and deliberate well past business hours. But
judges’ discretion could be wielded differently. By setting new norms in their
courtrooms and by refusing to allow trials and jury deliberations to run late,
judges have the power to refuse legislators’ expectations that they will cut
corners by holding lengthy trial days. Reform could also come from three
other avenues: model jury instructions that empower jurors to request rea-
sonable trial hours, preserving the issue of sleep deprivation for a successful
appeal, and state legislative solutions that mitigate the budgetary and policy
pressures on trial judges.
A. Judicial Discretion
The most important and necessary solution to the problem of late-night
trial and jury deliberations will be the rigorous exercise of judicial discretion.
At both the state and federal level, trial court judges are granted a vast
amount of discretion in the operation of their courts.129 Undoubtedly, those
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. E.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86–87 (1976); State v. Tennant, 265 So. 2d
230, 234 (La. 1972) (noting that trial courts in Louisiana, within their hours of operation, have
“broad discretion . . . to supervise and administer the trial and its incidents within constitu-
tional and legislative guidelines”); RICHARD C. RUSKELL, DAVIS AND SHULMAN’S GEORGIA
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 19:1 (2019–2020 ed.) (“It is the duty of the trial judge to direct
and supervise the course of the entire trial. In doing this he is vested with a large discretion
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judges are faced with numerous pressures to move their dockets, try cases
fairly and efficiently, and use resources effectively.130 But in elevating effi-
ciency over effective justice, current norms have damaged defendants’ rights
instead of upholding them. Given the far-ranging power allotted to trial
judges, their demands for appropriate trial time limits might slow the pace of
trials. But these time limits would provide greater protection to defendants’
fair trial rights. Further, it would signal to state legislators judges’ refusal to
be complicit in the underfunding of trial courts. Judges often consider the
desires of the constituencies that elect them (or the constituencies of the leg-
islators that appoint them).131 If judges slow the pace of trials via setting ex-
plicit trial day lengths and sticking to them, legislators will lose an easy
funding shortcut. Taking such a public stand for better funding may be diffi-
cult for judges considering electoral constraints, but by implicitly demanding
resources, judges are fulfilling their basic constitutional duties. Like the pub-
lic defender offices that have refused additional cases,132 trial court judges
can signal their unwillingness to be complicit in systemic constitutional vio-
lations.
In order to exercise discretion, trial court judges should focus on norm
setting. Norm setting tailors expectations of all parties involved and signals
to outside parties, such as legislators, that judges are employing their discre-
tion to afford parties in their courtrooms adequate time to try cases. Exam-
ples of effective norm setting include establishing certain times at which the
court must recess or setting a certain number of hours in the day that the
court will operate. For instance, the Tennessee Criminal Appellate Court has
used its discretion to enforce the expectation that “a defendant is entitled to
reasonably alert lawyers and witnesses.”133 As a result, trial judges who kept
courts in session for unreasonably lengthy periods of time were rebuked for
violations of defendants’ due process rights.134
Other courts have also endorsed the idea that jurors should have access
to rest periods during deliberations. These courts generally found that trial
judges overstepped their discretion and contradicted state statutes providing
which will not be interfered with by the appellate courts unless manifestly abused. In supervis-
ing the trial, it is the duty of the court to administer the law and guide the proceedings before
him so as to protect the rights of the parties.”).
130. Peter T. Grossi, Jr. et al., Crisis in the Courts: Reconnaissance and Recommendations,
NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.: TRENDS ST. CTS. (2012), https://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content
/microsites/future-trends-2012/home/better-courts/1-2-crisis-in-the-courts.aspx [https://
perma.cc/Z2K2-WZ4Y].
131. See Methods of Judicial Selection, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://judicialselection.us
/judicial_selection/methods/limited_jurisdiction_courts.cfm?state= [https://perma.cc/B7UZ-
CTL3].
132. See supra note 61.
133. 10 DAVID LOUIS RAYBIN, TENNESSEE PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 24:9 (2008).
134. See, e.g., State v. McMullin, 801 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990); Hembree
v. State, 546 S.W.2d 235, 243 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976).
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for lodging of sequestered jurors. Iowa is a particularly friendly state for ju-
ror overnight lodging and has repeatedly upheld the necessity of housing ju-
rors in hotels rather than asking them to continue to deliberate late into the
night. For example, in State v. Albers, the Iowa Supreme Court was dis-
missive of out-of-state case law upholding late-night deliberations as “vestig-
es of the early development of the jury system.”135 Before the English Juries
Act of 1870, unanimity in a jury was achieved through coercion, such as re-
quiring deliberation “without meat, drink or fire . . . until they did agree.”136
But, according to the court, the jury system has moved away from a time
when “the premium [was] on stamina and physical strength rather than
judgment.”137
In another notable Iowa Supreme Court case, State v. Green, the court
emphasized that the conditions of the deliberations, not merely their dura-
tion, determined their fairness.138 Indeed, the conditions were deeply trou-
bling: five jurors stated after the trial that they were so tired they could not
properly deliberate, and some jurors changed their vote from acquittal to
conviction because of their fatigue.139 While both the total time of delibera-
tion and the conditions (i.e., how long a jury goes without food or rest) are
“within the sound discretion of the trial court,” that discretion is not without
limits.140 As the Supreme Court of Iowa held, “the discretion to be exercised
[falls] within the framework of repeated pronouncements by this court that
unreasonably late deliberations by a jury are not conducive to a fair trial.”141
Further, in another Iowa Supreme Court case, Kracht v. Hoeppner, the court
135. 174 N.W.2d 649, 655 (Iowa 1970). Albers was cited as recently as 2013 to distinguish
a case where the jury had been “provided . . . with the opportunity to inform the court that
late-night deliberations would be a hardship” before they began deliberations at 9:00 p.m. and
ended at 3:30 a.m. State v. Purdin, No. 12CA944, 2013 WL 84897, at *2–3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan.
4, 2013). While it is heartening that Albers has informed another state court of appeals, the dis-
tinctions drawn by the Ohio Court of Appeals are not particularly meaningful. Jurors may be
more motivated by their desire to finish jury duty than by a desire to carefully deliberate, and it
is the responsibility of the trial judge to ensure that such deliberation occurs.
136. Albers, 174 N.W.2d at 655.
137. Id. at 656.
138. 121 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Iowa 1963).
139. Green, 121 N.W.2d at 93–95. It is possible that an exhausted jury could vote for ac-
quittal out of exhaustion, but “holding out” for acquittal is typically viewed by jury experts as
the harder task. Adam Liptak, Guilty by a 10-2 Vote: Efficient or Unconstitutional?, N.Y. TIMES
(July 6, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/07/us/07bar.html [https://perma.cc/RW87-
56H2]. One juror describes voting for conviction while believing the defendant was innocent:
We were required to deliberate during the entire 27 hours without being given an op-
portunity to go to bed or get any sleep. I voted for the acquittal of the defendant in every
ballot that was taken except the very last ballot, and I did not think he was guilty when I
voted for conviction on the last ballot, but gave in and voted for conviction because I
was completely worn out.
Green, 121 N.W.2d at 94.
140. Albers, 174 N.W.2d at 653–55.
141. Id. at 655.
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found “no valid reason to require a jury to deliberate all night” and mandat-
ed that jury members either go home or have hotel rooms secured for
them.142 The court later found that the cost of accommodation and the prac-
tice of not obtaining accommodation were not valid excuses for allowing the
all-night deliberations.143
Some courts, however, are unwilling to entirely overrule verdicts on the
grounds of inadequate juror rest but still admonish trial courts for creating
such hostile conditions. For example, in United States v. Parks, the First Cir-
cuit skated around hard-and-fast time limits on juror deliberation length but
noted its disapproval with the practice of keeping jurors late, particularly af-
ter a long trial: “[A]ny verdict returned at 3:07 in the morning after many
hours of deliberation following a long trial is much more likely to be the
product of mental and physical fatigue than of true deliberation.”144 In Coul-
thard v. Keenan, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that “sending a jury back to
its jury room about 2:10 a.m. after it reported it was hopelessly deadlocked
and after orally urging an agreement is not to be commended.”145
While courts have repeatedly given weight to the jury’s preference in
continuing with the trial or deliberation late at night, relatively little atten-
tion has been paid to the power dynamics within a courtroom. Timid jurors
may not speak up in such an unfamiliar, formal, and rigidly controlled envi-
ronment, even if a judge offers them a choice.146 Further, jurors may have
interests that caution against giving them the deciding vote in these instanc-
es. Eager to get back to work, their families, and their regular routines, they
may feel motivated to get the trial over with, rather than fully deliberate.147 It
is up to judges in those instances to be aware of and wary of those impulses.
There are potential downsides to norm setting. First, not all trials are for
serious offenses. Trials have a wide range of impacts on defendants’ lives if
they are found guilty. The difference between, for example, probation as
compared to a life sentence is enormous; perhaps the resources required for
a lengthy trial over a trivial offense are better spent elsewhere. But the Con-
stitution does not specify a range of trial guarantees according to the pun-
ishment a defendant faces. A right to a fair trial is a guarantee for everyone,
142. 140 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Iowa 1966).
143. Albers, 174 N.W.2d at 654; Green, 121 N.W.2d at 93.
144. 411 F.2d 1171, 1173 (1st Cir. 1969).
145. 129 N.W.2d 597, 602 (Iowa 1964).
146. See State v. McMullin, 801 S.W.2d 826, 831 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (“Judges must
also bear in mind that many jurors hesitate to complain to the court, and are greatly influenced
by what the will of the judge is perceived to be. Judges, in deciding the competency of jurors to
continue working, should rely upon more than just their expressed agreement to continue. A
careful objective judgment should be made.”).
147. The 1957 classic 12 Angry Men thoughtfully illustrated this very point. As one of the
twelve jurors states during deliberations, “[s]omebody saw the kid stab his father, what more
do we need? You guys can talk the ears right off my head, you know what I mean? I got three
garages of mine going to pot while you’re talking! So let’s get done and get out of here!” 12
ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957).
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regardless of the magnitude of the charge or punishment.148 Indeed, given
the volume of misdemeanors that rotate in and out of trial courts daily,149 it
can be easy for those regularly involved in the system to forget the impact
even a small charge can have on a defendant. Lost shelter, jobs, child custo-
dy, and reputation are only some of the collateral consequences of a brush
with the criminal justice system.150 Judges should not be looking to the seri-
ousness of the offense to determine the time and care with which a case
should be handled. Limitations on court hours remain essential for the fair
administration of justice in these cases.
Trial judges and their staff stand to benefit from regulated trial hours, in
addition to the benefits for jurors, defendants, and counsel. Judges, too, are
overworked.151 By guaranteeing themselves a standard day’s work in the “of-
fice” of the courtroom, they will need to become more creative in allocating
resources. But they will gain time before and after trial to resolve other mat-
ters. Jurors too will be more willing to serve jury duty with assurance that
they will keep reasonable hours each day.152 Jurors may spend more days
participating in jury trials, but adequate compensation for their service will
hopefully diminish this concern.
B. Establishing Reasonable Jury Expectations
Courts should use all of the tools at their disposal, including the trial cal-
endar and official communications with jurors, to establish reasonable
norms and expectations for jury service. While jury duty has never been
popular, trial courts are experiencing a wave of apathy in response to jury
duty.153 Innovative solutions like the ones proposed by District Court Judge
Mark Bennett could improve jurors’ perception of jury duty as well as its ac-
tual execution. Judge Bennett’s trials begin at 8:30 a.m. and run until 2:30
p.m. Lawyers are limited with hard timelines for the presentation of evi-
148. As long as that punishment involves six months or more of imprisonment. See U.S.
CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions . . . .”); see also Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S.
66, 68–69 (1970).
149. Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 277 (2011) (“Misdemeanor adjudications have
exploded in recent years, with one recent study estimating that the volume of misdemeanor
cases nationwide has risen from five to more than ten million between 1972 and 2006.”).
150. Id. at 363–67; Russell L. Weaver, The Perils of Being Poor: Indigent Defense and Ef-
fective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435, 436 (2003–2004).
151. Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering
Where Congress Is, HUFFPOST (Sept. 30, 2015, 2:15 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry
/judge-federal-courts-vacancies_n_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b [https://perma.cc/5MWP-
DS7R].
152. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, A Juror Bill of Rights, ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/09/the-juror-bill-of-rights/404833/ [https://
perma.cc/M4HX-8QZP].
153. See id. (“In trial courts across America, jurors are skipping jury duty.”).
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dence. The judge’s personal clock counts down each lawyer’s time.154 Other
judges generally allow lawyers to present admissible evidence without a
hard-and-fast time allowance.155 As Judge Bennett states: “If trial judges em-
braced WWJW [What Would Jurors Want] it would engender greater re-
spect for jurors and lead to trial innovations which would significantly en-
enhance the juror experience.”156 Potential pitfalls also exist with prioritizing
juror comfort. In a courtroom in which attorney time is heavily policed, de-
fense attorneys may miss important opportunities to go off script in ways
that help their client. But judges who police time will also cut down on time
wasted due to lack of preparation on both sides and better hold jurors’ atten-
tion.
Along the same lines, changes to model jury instructions and guides
could significantly improve the fairness of jury trials as well as the experience
of jurors. Across the country, many state and federal courts provide jurors
with fact sheets that include basic information about when and where to re-
port for jury duty, what to bring, and what number to call the morning of the
trial.157 However, very few courts give any information about how long the
trial day will actually last.158 Providing information about the length of a trial
day would improve the juror experience by allowing jurors to better plan
their day(s) and decrease the maze of scheduling conflicts during voir dire.159
C. Preserving the Issue for Appeal
Keeping the issue of a fair trial alive for appeal by raising it at trial is also
essential. Defense counsel’s failure to object waives errors, even constitution-
al ones.160 Additionally, a failure to object can serve as implicit permission
for the trial judge to continue with the trial: obtaining jury approval quells
many courts’ doubts about an unduly long trial day.161 Any day the trial
154. Id.
155. Mark W. Bennett, Reinvigorating and Enhancing Jury Trials Through an Overdue
Juror Bill of Rights: A Federal Trial Judge’s View, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 481, 494 (2016).
156. Id. at 481.
157. See, e.g., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN, ANN
ARBOR DIVISION, JUROR INFORMATION (2018), http://www.mied.uscourts.gov/Jury/AAeJuror
InfoLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET2W-9ECA].
158. See a list of 36 counties that provide information online about the length of the trial
day, including the counties that acknowledge these hours are flexible per discretion of the indi-
vidual judge (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
159. See Ferguson, supra note 152.
160. E.g., Garza v. State, 783 S.W.2d 796, 798 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); see also People v.
Sawyer, 545 N.W.2d 6, 13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (“Defendant failed to object to the length of
the day below and this issue is not preserved for appeal.”).
161. See State v. McMullin, 801 S.W.2d 826, 827–31 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing
Seelbach v. State, 572 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978)) (“At 9:13 p.m. counsel for one of
the defendants pointed out the lateness of the hour and the judge immediately adjourned court
and reconvened Saturday morning. . . . Implicit in that case is that no objection was made until
9:13 p.m. . . . .”).
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court continues past a reasonable hour, the defense attorney should state
their objection on the record so that the issue can be appealable beyond clear
error. Courts should also be concerned with the fatigue of the attorneys, wit-
nesses, and judges themselves.162 Additionally, a successful appeal of this is-
sue requires that defense counsel preserve sufficient evidence of an unduly
long trial day.163
Another benefit of raising the issue at trial is the opportunity for the trial
judge to preemptively solve the problem. By bringing to a judge’s attention
any potential issues with timing, the judge can speak with the attorneys, de-
fendant, and jurors about their preferences or simply send everyone home
for the night. The judge can also articulate their reasoning for stopping or
continuing the trial, which will allow reviewing appellate judges to better
understand the problems facing their colleagues at the trial level.
A well-preserved record makes it easy for a neutral observer to figure
out what went wrong and when. It may seem futile in districts that are un-
sympathetic to long trial days to raise this issue. But if trial attorneys contin-
uously object and appeal the issue, appellate courts will be forced to
acknowledge the problem and begin to more seriously consider its effects on
all parties involved.
D. Legislative Solutions
New Hampshire is pioneering legislative solutions to the problem of
overlong trial days. There, a state statute requires courts to provide housing
to jurors and establishes a mandatory time at which deliberations must end
and jurors must sleep:
Jurors shall not be required to continue their deliberations without sleep
and rest later than 12:00 in the evening. At that hour, or earlier, under such
safeguards and conditions as the court may direct, they shall be afforded
suitable opportunity for sleep and rest, at the expense of the state, for at
least 8 hours before again taking up their deliberations.164
This limitation on jury deliberations demonstrates an awareness of the issue
of juror sleep and its central importance to a fair trial. By making explicit
these requirements, New Hampshire—and other states that follow its exam-
ple—recognize that oppressive physical conditions are coercive to the jury
deliberation process. Legislatures across the country should expand on this
type of language to include trial day length as well. The coercion that oper-
ates on sleep-deprived jurors is just as offensive to the constitutional guaran-
162. See id. at 830.
163. See Garza, 783 S.W.2d at 799 (“Appellant could have supported the claim he now
makes by affidavits from jurors attached to his motion for new trial, but he did not. . . . In the
absence of any evidence that the jurors reached their verdict because they felt coerced to do so,
appellant has not demonstrated fundamental error.”).
164. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519:25 (2007).
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tee of a fair trial whether during the presentation of evidence or in the delib-
eration room.
Legislative solutions force the branch of government with the purse
strings to directly undertake substantive reform measures. But these solu-
tions have the benefit of impacting defendants who do not raise the issue at
trial or whose trial judges do not raise the issue themselves. Legislators can
and should champion fair trial rights, as they are increasingly doing across
the country on a wide range of issues.165 In an era of increased awareness
around the problems of mass incarceration and concern for fair trial rights,
legislators may find it politically advantageous to create rules that place the
onus on the judicial branch to carry out its constitutional burden.
CONCLUSION
Overly long trial days and jury deliberations are only one part of a
broadly dysfunctional criminal justice system. Other areas of reform, includ-
ing bail reform, prosecutorial discretion, and the war on drugs, provide vital
context to the problem presented in this Note. Like most aspects of the crim-
inal justice system, the consequences of overly long trial days and jury delib-
erations fall most heavily on indigent criminal defendants. But unlike many
other areas of criminal justice reform, the problems presented here have the
potential to be easier fixes, as long as actors in the criminal justice system are
willing to acknowledge they are in fact constitutional problems.
165. See, e.g., Jaweed Kaleem, The Feds Just Passed Criminal Justice Reform. Here’s Why
State-Level Efforts Matter More, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com
/nation/la-na-criminal-justice-reform-20181230-story.html [https://perma.cc/TQB5-CBPZ];
see also Julia O’Donoghue, Louisiana Criminal Justice Reform Passed by Legislature,
NOLA.COM (June 6, 2017, 2:40 AM), https://www.nola.com/news/politics/article_37e2770d-
f7e8-5fc4-bf15-e483ecc7b8bc.html [https://perma.cc/6CMZ-PFC6].
